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Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001000220007-2

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR [redacted]

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SUBJECT: Routing and Handling of Correspondence or
Papers Bearing on Activities of the United
States Intelligence Board

1. As you know, the Director regularly receives correspondence or papers from USIB members or agencies dealing with matters which have been or will be considered by the USIB. Some of these papers are addressed to him as "Chairman, United States Intelligence Board" and some as "Director of Central Intelligence." The form of the address appears occasionally to have affected the internal routing of such correspondence. For that reason I believe it desirable that we regularize some procedure for handling these papers within CIA.

2. Where prior or potential USIB business is referred to in such correspondence it is important that the Executive Secretary, USIB, be advised immediately. I suggest, therefore, that arrangements be made to route this correspondence to the Secretariat at the same time as it is passed to the Director. Where correspondence arrives in duplicate please route the carbon to the Secretariat; if only an original arrives I suggest that it be handcarried to the Secretariat (Room 122, Administration Building) so that a copy can be made and retained by the Secretariat prior to routing the paper to the Director.

Careen

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[redacted]
ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

6 Feb. 57

EXECUTIVE RECORD FILE *USIB*)

28 January 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, O/DCI

SUBJECT : Proposed USIB Security Committee

1. Attached is the memorandum from General Truscott to the Director, dated 21 January, and the memorandum to the Director from the Director of Security, dated 5 November 1958, attaching the proposed DCID on a security committee. I take an exceedingly dim view of the fact that this memorandum and the proposed directive have been circulating approximately three months and were never called to the attention of this office. Not only is the subject a matter of interest to this office, but it directly relates to our work. I recognize of course that the original fault is with the Office of Security for having prepared a concurrence sheet which called for the signatures of the four deputies but not the Inspector General. It is my opinion, based upon what the Director has said both internally and externally, that matters of a general nature such as this affecting the over-all work of the agency are properly within the purview of this office. Consequently I think the Inspector General's name should be included for concurrence. Further, I would point out that there have been several instances lately where matters of direct interest to this staff have only inadvertently come to my attention, and I would assume that there are other matters of interest which have failed to come to our attention.

2. As far as the substance of the proposal is concerned, I concur in the proposed directive and believe that it will not conflict with other established committees dealing with security matters as long as its charter is specifically restricted to section 5, NSCID-1. I also reiterate my oral suggestion made at the deputies meeting on 27 January that in presenting this to USIB the Director call to the attention of the Board the memorandum from Gordon Gray on the subject, dated 26 September 1958.

*DCI noted and approved
submission to USIB Board*
31 Jan 59. *EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR* *LL*
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

21 January 1959

Executive Registry

71-21571

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposed USIB Security Committee

1. This memorandum contains a suggested course of action with respect to tabling a proposed DCID at a future USIB meeting. This suggestion is contained in paragraph 2.

2. A succession of recent disclosures jeopardizing sources and methods clearly indicates a need for a security committee such as Edwards recommends in his memorandum attached hereto. Since there is no such committee in existence to propose such Terms of Reference, I suggest that the best procedure would be for you to table the proposed DCID at an early USIB meeting with an oral statement

(a) pointing out the lack of such a committee at the present time and emphasizing the important assistance such a committee might render;

(b) suggesting that the Board members and their staffs study the draft proposal;

(c) invite suggestions and indicate the availability of Sher Edwards and his staff and other CIA offices for consultation; and

(d) consideration for approval at a meeting about two weeks hence.

L. K. THOMAS, JR.
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Director (Coordination)

cc: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Attachment

1st Concert
(P.C.)
D
21 Jan 59

Distribution:

- 0 & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - Dir/Security via DD/S
- ER

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Executive Record

10-9-61

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT : Proposed DCID to Establish a
USIB Security Committee**

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph (1).

2. The publication of the 15 September 1958 revision of NSCID No. 1 (New Series) places certain responsibilities in the security field upon the DCI and the USIB. Since there is neither a committee within USIB nor a regularly constituted inter-Agency medium through which actions might be initiated, it appears necessary that a mechanism be established for this purpose.

3. In view of the increased emphasis upon the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, it must be assumed that both the DCI and the USIB will review present directives and may initiate action for the further development of policies, procedures, and practices to provide the necessary safeguards for the protection of community intelligence.

4. The security responsibilities under NSCID No. 1 are as follows:

FOR THE USIB

a. In Section 2 paragraph a (5) the USIB shall "Develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

**b. FOR THE MEMBER DEPARTMENTS
AND AGENCIES**

In Section (5), 'Each department and agency, however, shall remain responsible for the

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protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization. Each shall also establish appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that agency of intelligence information or activity".

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

- c. In Section (5) "The Director of Central Intelligence, with the assistance and support of the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure".

In addition to the above the Director has been given a special responsibility as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or of intelligence sources or methods. A report of these investigations, including corrective measures taken or recommended within the departments and agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for review and such further action as may be appropriate, including reports to the National Security Council or the President".

5. These responsibilities will require a continuing review of security practices and procedures by both the USIB and the member departments and agencies. In this regard Executive Order 10501, effective December 1953, sets the minimum standards for the safeguarding of classified defense information and thus provides uniformity in the basic procedures among the departments and agencies of government. Most departments and agencies in the intelligence community have supplemented Executive Order 10501 with additional internal control procedures, particularly

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where intelligence and special source material is involved. These supplemental controls have usually been instituted on the basis of security requirements peculiar to the department or agency concerned and not necessarily on the basis of a security problem common to the intelligence community.

6. There is no present authorized committee within the intelligence community to deal with security matters relating to the overall protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure and the development of uniformity where appropriate in security procedures. The IAC did not have a committee for security matters of this nature. The USCIB did have a special committee on Comint Personnel Security Standards but this committee has been inoperative for the past two years. There was also an established USIB Security Committee (USCIB SECCOM) largely concerned with procedural matters, however, this committee, since the formation of USIB, has been inoperative and there is no security committee in USIB to which its functions can logically be assigned. NSCID No. 6 provides in conformity with Section (2) NSCID No. 1 that the USIB shall study standards and practices of the departments and agencies in protecting Comint; and determine the degree and type of security protection to be given ELINT activities.

Security directives carried over from the IAC and the USCIB which are currently in effect are DCID No. 11/1, Control of Initial Information Regarding Foreign Nuclear Explosions, DCID No. 11/2 Control of Dissemination and Use of Intelligence and Intelligence Information, and USCIB No. 5 Standards and Practices for Clearance of Personnel for Comint.

The continuous review of security directives and concern with overall security matters affecting the intelligence community must necessarily be provided for by the USIB to carry out its responsibilities.

7. In the past several years there have been serious unauthorized disclosures of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods. The investigations of these unauthorized disclosures have been carried out under difficult circumstances by the informal cooperative efforts of the security officers in the affected agencies and departments through their

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normal security channels. The informality of this system has retarded the investigative function in that there was no established central coordinating point to channel the investigative activities and exchange timely investigative leads and information. The results of these investigations revealed several violations of existing security regulations but more importantly, revealed certain weaknesses in the security systems of the intelligence community in the dissemination and the handling of intelligence information. Certain corrective recommendations resulted from these investigations but there was no single committee or mechanism by which action on these corrective measures could be taken on an overall community basis.

8. It is felt that there are more unauthorized disclosures of information than is apparent to the intelligence community and some of these are accordingly never reported and investigated. The intricacies of the intelligence community structure with its specialized committees and special channels of information have aggravated this problem. The discovery of a possible unauthorized disclosure is frequently disseminated by those intelligence officers dealing with substantive intelligence information who recognize their information in unauthorized hands. Often these suspicions are not immediately forwarded to the professional security officers who must take investigative action. The wide spread and timely exchange of information in the intelligence community makes it impossible to readily identify, in situations involving an unauthorized disclosure, these departments and agencies involved, as all have been recipients of the identical piece of intelligence information. In the absence of a system for the reporting of suspected violations on a community basis, much valuable time is lost from the investigative standpoint in determining the principal agencies involved and organizing the informal liaison contacts in order to pursue a mutual investigative effort. Lacking a clearly defined procedure on a community level, there is certain resultant confusion and duplication of effort. In circumstances where the violation is suspected but not evident and no department appears to have primary responsibility or interest, there is a natural hesitation in the intelligence community to suggest through liaison channels that the violation may have occurred in another department. Accordingly, inaction is likely to be the final result.

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9. In view of the rapid developments in the intelligence complex and frequent adjustments in the organizational structure to meet these changes, the security practices and procedures to be effective must be kept under constant review. Weaknesses that are permitted to develop in the security system will sooner or later lead to unauthorized disclosures and the resultant investigations will generally reveal these weaknesses. Failure to eliminate the weaknesses on a community level will merely compound the security problems involved. The individual security officers of the member departments and agencies cannot solve these problems by unilateral action but should have a committee mechanism whereby the security officers can focalize their mutual problems and more effectively develop and coordinate corrective actions.

10. It is, therefore, proposed that a USIB committee composed of the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies be established to act upon the security responsibilities established for USIB under NSCID No. 1 and to serve as a support mechanism, when requested, to the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise of his special responsibilities set forth in Section 5 of NSCID No. 1.

11. It is recommended that the attached proposed DCID be submitted to the USIB for approval.

SIGNED

**Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security**

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
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1 - DDP
1 - DDI
3 - DDS
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Attachment:

Proposed DCID

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CONCURRENCES:

(Signed) Richard Helms

19 NOV 1958

Deputy Director(Plans)

Date

19 Nov 1958

of para 2

Date

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

/s/

Deputy Director (Support)

Date

1 Nov 58

15/

Deputy Director(Coordination)

Date

21 Jan 1959

15/ C P C
D D C J Jan 59

The recommendation contained in paragraph 11 is approved.

Date

Director

Proposed DCID as rewritten, and approved by DDCI on
31 Jan 59 being circulated for consideration. It was signed by
USIB by USIB Secretary.

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S-1-3

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO.

Security Committee

Pursuant to Section 2, sub-paragraph a (5) and Section 5, NSCID No. 1 (New Series) revised 15 September 1958 and for the purpose of preventing unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods, a standing committee of the USIB is hereby established.

1. Composition and Organization

The committee shall be known as the USIB Security Committee and shall include representatives of the USIB agencies. It is expected that the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies of USIB will serve as the representatives on the committee. Other agencies of the government may be invited by the committee to participate as appropriate. The CIA member will chair the committee.

2. Mission

The mission of the committee shall be to promote means by which the intelligence community may prevent the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods.

3. Functions

a) To develop and review security standards, practices and procedures as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and to make recommendations thereon to the Board. The Committee shall coordinate closely with other Committees of the Board with related security responsibilities.

b) To assist, as requested, the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise of his responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, NSCID No. 1.

c) To recommend security policy to the USIB as it pertains to the intelligence community. Such policy recommendations shall be consonant, however, with the responsibility of each department and agency for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization and

the establishment of appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that department and agency of intelligence information or activity.

d) The Committee shall make such other reports and recommendations to the Board as may be appropriate or requested.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	DDI -	fran	
2	Recommend you sign -		
3	DD/C	LRT 21 Jan	
4	Gen Cables		
5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks: Note: This proposed draft is Ok with me, It may come under fire in the Commis Committee however. Jn - Spint/OCI says OK - It looks alright to me too (not)			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE	
		13 Jan 80	
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Deputy Director (Support)	JHJ	6 Jan 59
2	Deputy Director (Plans)	ML	
3	Deputy Director (Intelligence)		
4	Deputy Director (Coordination)		
5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

Remarks: In a recent meeting with the Acting DDI and the DDC two changes were made in the proposed DCID as originally submitted. These changes are: (1) to paragraph 3 (a) the following was added "...and to make recommendations thereon to the Board. The Committee shall coordinate closely with other Committees of the Board with related security responsibilities." (2) Paragraph 3 (d) was rewritten to read "...The Committee shall make such other reports and recommendations to the Board as may be appropriate or requested." As originally submitted this paragraph read, "The Committee shall make reports to the USIB as may be appropriate or requested."

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Director of Security Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP30B00220007-2 UNCLASSIFIED	1/21/59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1		b	6 Feb
2			10/26
3			2/9/59
5	Alice	ab	2/11/59
3	June	jj	2/10/59
4	Chris	led	2/10/59
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

For your information.

ER -

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

EO/DCI

b1p

6 Feb 59

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MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DULLES

You indicated you felt this was
a good idea, but wanted to discuss
it at the Morning Meeting.

JMC

24 Jan 59
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 16 December 1959
TO: Executive Registry		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: For retention.		
FROM: USIB/S		
ROOM NO. 305	BUILDING Admin.	EXTENSION <input type="text"/>

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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